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1 Introduction
The proposals of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Com-
mittee hereafter) for the revision of minimum requirements for banks’ risk
capital have raised a lot of discussions how to quantify the loss given default
(LGD) used for capital calculations. In particular, a number of interested par-
ties including industry associations and national supervisors have asked the
Committee to further elaborate on the so-called “downturn LGD” standard
described in the proposals, which requires that estimated downturn LGD must
“reflect economic downturn conditions where necessary to capture the relevant
risks.” In September 2004, the Committee’s Capital Task Force and its Ac-
cord Implementation Group agreed to set up the LGD working group to share
views and consider appropriate approaches to meeting the requirements re-
garding LGD estimates. After several months, the LGD working group have
drawn the following three findings.
First, the potential for realized recovery rates (which is one minus the LGD)
to be lower than average during times of high default rates may be a material
source of unexpected credit losses for some exposures or portfolios. Failing to
account for this possibility risks understating the capital required to cover un-
expected losses. Second, data limitations pose an important challenge to the
estimation of LGD parameters in general, and of LGD parameters consistent
with economic downturn conditions in particular. Third, there is currently lit-
tle consensus within the banking industry with respect to appropriate methods
for incorporating downturn conditions in LGD estimates. (See Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision(2005))
While a significant body of academic and practitioner research suggests that
systematic volatility in recovery rates is a potentially important source of
unexpected credit losses for some exposures or portfolios, only a couple of
research papers propose a way to incorporate the effects of systematic risk
on recovery rates directly into estimated LGD (for instance, Pykhtin(2003),
Dirk(2004)).
In the context of the discussion on downturn LGD, this paper tries to make
some contributions. We propose a so-called mapping function from the long-
term average LGD to downturn LGD, similar to the Basel Committee’s map-
ping function from the long-term probability of default to the conditional
default probability. Just like the historically observed default probability data
can be transformed to the conditional probability of default in the Basel Com-
mittee’s framework, only the historically observed LGD data are sufficient to
estimate the downturn LGD in the proposed mapping function. In particular,
the proposed mapping function is quite general so that large number of specific
assumptions on the distributional assumptions on LGD can be applied to the
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mapping function. Finally numerical examples based on a specific assumption
on the the distributional form are compared to the original Basel Committee’s
framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
internal ratings based approach suggested by the Committee. Section 3 pro-
poses the single risk factor model of the LGD. Section 4 illustrates the model
numerically under some specific assumption. Section 5 summarizes and con-
cludes the paper.
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2 A Brief Review of IRB Approach
There are always some borrowers that fail to meet their obligations. The losses
caused by default events fluctuate every year, depending on the number and
severity of default events. Financial institutions never know in advance the
losses that they will experience in a particular year. They can, however, fore-
cast the expected loss by estimating the proportion of obligors that might
default within a given time horizon, multiplied by the outstanding exposure
at default and once more multiplied by the percentage of exposure that will
not be recovered by sale of collateral. The expected loss can then be written
as
IE[L] = PD · EAD · LGD (1)
where PD is the probability of default, EAD is the exposure at default, and
LGD is the loss (rate) given default. These three random variables are the risk
parameters upon which the internal ratings based (IRB) approach is built.
Under the asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model assumed by the IRB
approach (Gordy(2003)), the loss rate for a well diversified portfolio depends
only on the (single) systematic risk factor and not on idiosyncratic risk factors
associated with individual exposures. If X denotes the systematic risk factor
and L denotes the loss rate on the exposure, financial institutions must hold,
for each exposure, IE[L|X = α] percentage of provisions and capital to satisfy
99.9% VaR(Value-at-Risk) target, where α is 99.9th percentile of the standard
normal distribution.
By introducing an indicator variable D (which is 1 if default, 0 otherwise),
IE[L|X = α] can be written as
IE[L|X = α] = P (D = 1|X = α) · IE[L|D = 1, X = α] (2)
The first term is the conditional default probability (CPD) of the exposure
given the 99.9th percentile adverse movement of systematic risk factor and the
second term is the conditional loss given default based on the same adverse
movement of X. The conditional loss given default(CLGD) can be thought as
the so-called “downturn LGD”.
In the IRB approach, financial institutions are not required to estimate CPDs
directly. Instead, a mapping function is provided by the Basel Committee to
calculate an exposure’s conditional default probability from their own estimate
of expected default probability.
CPD = Φ
(
Φ−1(PD) +
√
ρ · Φ−1(0.999)√
1− ρ
)
(3)
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where Φ(x) is a standard normal cumulative density function, Φ−1(p) is the
inverse of this function, and ρ is an asset-value-correlation (AVC) parameter
prescribed by the Basel Committee.
Combining equations (2) and (3) produces the following expression for the
conditional loss (rate) of an exposure.
IE[L|X = α] = Φ
(
Φ−1(PD) +
√
ρ · Φ−1(0.999)√
1− ρ
)
· CLGD (4)
This formula forms the core of the IRB risk-weight functions that appear in
the Framework Document.
In summary, the IRB approach allows financial institutions to use their own
internal estimates for key drivers (such as the borrower’ probability of de-
fault, exposure at default, and loss given default) to calculate the required
risk capital, subject to meeting certain conditions and the supervisory ap-
proval. These risk parameters are converted into risk weights and regulatory
capital requirements by means of risk weight formulas specified by the Basel
Committee 1 .
1 This section is largely based on “Background note on LGD quantification” from
the Committee.
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3 LGD modelling
In finance, it is frequently assumed that the asset return is distributed as a
normal random variable S ∼ N(µ, σ2), where µ and σ are mean and standard
deviation, respectively. Under the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach, the
asset return is considered as a latent variable and the asymptotic single risk
factor model (Gordy(2003))
S = µ− bX + ω ξ (5)
is assumed where X ∼ N(0, 1) and ξ ∼ N(0, 1). The random variable X
denotes the systematic risk factor which is common to each obligor and the
random variable ξ represents the idiosyncratic risk factor associated with in-
dividual obligor 2 . Idiosyncratic shock ξ is assumed to be independent from
the systematic risk factor X.
Alternatively, the asset return is standardized and is given by
Y =
S − µ
σ
= −√ρX +
√
1− ρ ξ (6)
where
√
ρ = b/σ denotes the exposure to the common systematic risk factor.
The standardized return Y can be interpreted as the obligor’s ability to pay
debts.
In the IRB approach, default events are assumed to occur if Y ≤ C, where C
is a certain critical value. In other words, when the standardized return Y , or
the ability-to-pay variable, of an obligor is less than or equal to some critical
value, the obligor is classified as default. The probability of default can then
be expressed as
P (Y ≤ C) = P (−√ρX +
√
1− ρ ξ ≤ C) (7)
For practical purposes, the probability of default needs not to be calculated
theoretically. Rather, it is usually estimated from historical experiences of
default.
The conditional probability of default given that the systematic risk factor X
is set to some known value α is represented as
P (Y ≤ C|X = α) = P
(
ξ ≤ C +
√
ρα√
1− ρ
)
(8)
which is equivalent to (3), assuming that the critical value C is Φ−1(PD) and
α is the 99.9th percentile from the standard normal distribution.
2 It should hold that b2 + ω2 = σ2.
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While the ability-to-pay variable Y only plays a role that determines whether
an obligor defaults or not in the IRB framework, Y may also be interpreted
as information variable containing the capability of an obligor to pay debts
given default. If a certain defaulted obligor’s ability-to-pay variable Y is much
less than the other defaulted obligor’s Y , then the former might be considered
to have much less ability to pay debts than the latter does. Thus, we may
postulate that the smaller the ability-to-pay variable Y is, the larger the loss
occurs when an obligor defaults. In that case, we may express the loss rate
due to an obligor as a monotonically decreasing function of Y .
L = f(Y ) (9)
Now the expected loss in (2) can be restated as
IE[L|X = α] = IE[f(Y )|Y ≤ C,X = α] · P (Y ≤ C|X = α) (10)
which states that the bank’s regulatory capital can be calculated as a product
of the conditional expectation of loss given default and the conditional prob-
ability of default. With the help of the LGD modelling in this section, the
conditional expectation of loss given default can be written as
IE[f(−√ρX +
√
1− ρ ξ) | − √ρX +
√
1− ρ ξ ≤ C, X = α] (11)
In order to find the explicit expression for the conditional expectation of loss
given default when the systematic risk factor X is set to α, the joint prob-
ability of loss, default and systematic risk factor, P (L = t,D = 1, X = α),
should be specified. Though this joint probability seems to contain three ran-
dom variables at a first glance, the modelling of this section makes this joint
probability having only two random variables, X and ξ. Thus the joint prob-
ability can be obtained by transforming of joint pdf of X and ξ, and can be
restated as
P (−√ρX +
√
1− ρ ξ = f−1(t),−√ρX +
√
1− ρ ξ ≤ C,X = α) (12)
And the conditional pdf of P (L = t|D = 1, X = α) can be explicitly found by
P (Y = f−1(t)|Y ≤ C,X = α) = φ(
f−1(t)+√ρα√
1−ρ )
Φ(
C+
√
ρα√
1−ρ )
· 1√
1− ρ, −∞ < f
−1(t) ≤ C
(13)
where Y = −√ρX +√1− ρ ξ and C = Φ−1(PD). The detailed derivation of
(13) is in the Appendix.
Therefore the conditional expectation of LGD given that the systematic risk
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factor X is set to α can be calculated by
IE[f(Y )|Y ≤ C,X = α] =
∫ C
−∞
f(u)
φ(
u+
√
ρα√
1−ρ )
Φ(
C+
√
ρα√
1−ρ )
· 1√
1− ρ du (14)
The remaining problem is how to choose an appropriate functional form of f
and this will be addressed is the next section.
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4 Numerical example
In the previous section, we suggest that the loss rate can be modelled as a
monotonically decreasing function of an obligor’s ability-to-pay variable Y .
L = f(Y ) (15)
The choice of f depends on the characteristics of loss (rate) given default. In
practice, the usual choice of the loss given default distribution is a Beta dis-
tribution with two parameters a and b. This choice can be justified by the fact
the support of the distribution is [0, 1], which is appropriate for modelling the
(loss) rate. Also, the Beta distribution represents various shapes through the
parameters a and b. Finally, it is straightforward to estimate the parameters
a and b by moment matching given the historical average and variance of the
realized loss data.
In this section, we compare the risk capital charges by the current Basel II
formula with those by specific assumption of the functional form f . Specifically
we assume the following
L = f(Y ) = IB−1(
Φ(C)− Φ(Y )
Φ(C)
), Y < C (16)
where IB−1 denotes inverse of the beta cumulative distribution function. The
modelling of this paper is still valid for other choices of f 3 .
The exposure to the common systematic risk factor ρ involved in the risk
weight function were set according to the rule for corporate exposures (See
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision(2003)), i.e.
ρ = ρ(PD) =
1− e−50PD
1− e−50 0.12 +
(
1− 1− e
−50PD
1− e−50
)
0.24 (17)
Table 1 lists the results in the case of varying PDs with fixed expected LGD.
In Table 1, our model’s charge is calculated by IE[L|X = α] − EL. Table 2,
which list the results in the case of fixed PD with varying expected LGDs also
have the same implication as Table 1. The implication from both Table 1 and
Table 2 supports the finding of LGD working group in the Basel Committee
that the potential for realized LGDS to be lower than average during times
of high default rates may be a material source of unexpected credit losses for
3 In case that there exists no inverse function of f , generalized inverse function of
f can be used.
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some exposures or portfolios. Since the capital charges calculated by a new
methodology suggested in the paper are always greater than the original Basel
charges, the suggested methodology may serve as a remedy for the original
Basel risk weight function.
Just by changing the conditional LGD with the suggested LGD formula, we
confirm the relationship
IE[L|X = α] = CLGD · Φ
(
Φ−1(PD) +
√
ρ · Φ−1(0.999)√
1− ρ
)
(18)
Lastly, Figure 1 shows the 3-dimensional relationship of the capital charge
with varying PDs and varying LGDs.
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PD Basel II charge Our model’s charge Conditional LGD Conditional PD
0.03 0.35 0.36 26.06 1.38
0.10 0.91 0.93 27.20 3.42
0.25 1.75 1.81 28.17 6.41
0.50 2.72 2.83 28.93 9.77
0.75 3.41 3.57 29.35 12.17
1.00 3.94 4.16 29.62 14.03
2.00 5.29 5.73 30.14 19.03
3.00 6.18 6.84 30.37 22.53
5.00 7.65 8.75 30.77 28.45
7.50 9.38 11.03 31.35 35.17
10.00 10.98 13.18 31.95 41.25
15.00 13.72 17.02 33.07 51.46
20.00 15.91 20.31 34.06 59.64
100.00 24.81 46.81 46.81 100.00
Table 1
Capital charge and Risk quantities. Expected LGD fixed at 22%. All figures in %
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PD Basel II charge Our model’s charge Conditional LGD Conditional PD
5.00 1.22 1.27 9.08 14.03
10.00 2.11 2.21 15.73 14.03
15.00 2.90 3.05 21.75 14.03
20.00 3.65 3.85 27.42 14.03
25.00 4.36 4.61 32.87 14.03
30.00 5.05 5.35 38.14 14.03
35.00 5.72 6.07 43.27 14.03
40.00 6.37 6.77 48.29 14.03
45.00 7.01 7.46 53.20 14.03
50.00 7.64 8.14 58.01 14.03
55.00 8.25 8.80 62.72 14.03
60.00 8.85 9.45 67.34 14.03
65.00 9.43 10.08 71.87 14.03
70.00 10.00 10.70 76.30 14.03
75.00 10.56 11.31 80.61 14.03
80.00 11.10 11.90 84.82 14.03
85.00 11.62 12.47 88.89 14.03
90.00 12.12 13.02 92.80 14.03
95.00 12.59 13.54 96.51 14.03
100.00 13.02 14.02 99.97 14.03
Table 2
Capital charge and Risk quantities. PD fixed at 1%. All figures in %
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Fig. 1. Capital Charge with varying PD and LGD
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5 Concluding Remarks
The proposals of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for the revision
of minimum requirements for bank’s risk capital leave the quantification of
loss-given-default (LGD) parameter used for capital calculation unspecified.
We propose a so-called mapping function from the long-term average LGD
to downturn LGD, similar to the Basel Committee’s mapping function from
the long-term probability of default to the conditional default probability.
In particular, the proposed mapping function is quite general so that large
number of specific assumptions on the functional form can be applied to the
mapping function. Finally numerical examples based on a specific assumption
on the the functional form are compared to the original Basel Committee’s
framework.
The implication from numerical examples supports the finding of LGD working
group in the Basel Committee that the potential for realized LGDS to be lower
than average during times of high default rates may be a material source of
unexpected credit losses for some exposures or portfolios. Since the capital
charges calculated by a new methodology suggested in the paper are always
greater than the original Basel charges, the suggested methodology may serve
as a remedy for the original Basel risk weight function.
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A Appendix
Let
Y1=−√ρX (A.1)
Y2=−√ρX +
√
1− ρ ξ (A.2)
X =− Y1√
ρ
(A.3)
ξ=
Y2 − Y1√
1− ρ (A.4)
The Jacobian of the transformation is
|J | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− 1√
ρ
0
− 1√
1−ρ
1√
1−ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
1√
ρ
√
1− ρ (A.5)
The joint pdf of (Y1, Y2) is
fY1,Y2(y1, y2) = φ(−
y1√
ρ
)φ(
y2 − y1√
1− ρ)
(
1√
ρ
√
1− ρ
)
(A.6)
which is N(ρy2, ρ(1− ρ)) ·N(0, 1).
The marginal pdf of Y1 is
fY1(y1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fY1,Y2(y1, y2)dy2 = φ(
−y1√
ρ
)
1√
ρ
(A.7)
which is N(0, ρ).
The marginal pdf of Y2 is
fY2(y2) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fY1,Y2(y1, y2)dy1 = φ(y2) (A.8)
which is N(0, 1).
The conditional probability of Y2 given Y1 is
P (Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1) = φ(y2 − y1√
1− ρ)
(
1√
1− ρ
)
(A.9)
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which is N(y1, 1− ρ).
The conditional probability of Y1 given Y2 is
P (Y1 = y1|Y2 = y2) = φ( y1 − ρy2√
ρ
√
1− ρ)
(
1√
ρ
√
1− ρ
)
(A.10)
which is N(ρy2, ρ(1− ρ)).
Using this transformation, we can describe P (L = t|Y < C,X = α) as follow-
ing
P (L = t|Y < C,X = α) = P (L = t, Y < C,X = α)
P (Y < C,X = α)
=
P (L = t, Y < C,X = α)
P (Y < C|X = α)P (X = α)
=
P (Y2 < C, Y1 = −√ρα)
P (Y2 < C|Y1 = −√ρα)P (Y1 = −√ρα) −∞ < f
−1(t) ≤ C
(A.11)
Let Y2 = f
−1(t), and P (Y2 < C|Y1 = −√ρα) denotes the CPD. We can derive
(13) by substituting (A.6) and (A.8) in this equation,
P (Y = f−1(t)|Y ≤ C,X = α) = φ(
f−1(t)+√ρα√
1−ρ )
Φ(
C+
√
ρα√
1−ρ )
· 1√
1− ρ, −∞ < f
−1(t) ≤ C
(A.12)
16
References
[1] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2003). The New Basel Capital
Accord. Bank for International Settlements, July 2003.
[2] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2004). Modifications to the capital
treatment for expected and unexpected credit losses. Bank for International
Settlements, January 2004
[3] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2005). Guidance on Paragraph 468
of the Framework Document. Bank for International Settlements, July 2005.
[4] Gordy, M. B. (2000). A comparative anatomy of credit risk models, Journal of
Banking and Finance, Vol 24, pp.119-149.
[5] Gordy, M. B. (2003). A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank
capital rule. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol 12, pp. 199-232.
[6] Pykhtin, M. (2003). Unexpected recovery risk. Risk, Vol 16, No 8. pp. 74-78.
[7] Tasche, Dirk. (2004). The single risk factor approach to capital charges in case
of correlated loss given default rates. Working paper, Deutsche Bundesbank,
February 2004.
17
